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Test-based Accountability Systems: Concerns
for Indiana’s Multilingual Learners and Their
Teachers
KATIE BROOKS,
Butler University
BROOKE KANDEL-CISCO,
Butler University
Indiana’s current test-based accountability system grew, in part,
out of decades of federal-level educational reform initiatives.
This article reviews the history of Indiana’s test-based
accountability system for schools and details how the system
calculates evaluative ratings for Indiana teachers and schools.
Additionally, the article analyzes how the Indiana accountability
system contradicts what is known about appropriate measurement
of English language learners and lists psychometric and validity
concerns such as valid assessment, non-random assignment,
norming groups, and ceiling/bottom effects. This article calls
for a system in which multiple assessments offer rich data for
school and teacher evaluations.
Keywords: accountability, teacher evaluation, English
learners
The past several years have been marked by rapid change in Indiana
education policy. Stakeholders at all levels including children, parents,
teachers, and administrators have been affected by changes in standards,
testing, evaluation, and public school funding to name a few. In this
article, we seek to outline changes in Indiana’s education accountability
systems and highlight how those changes intersect with what is
known about appropriate measurement of English language learners.
Additionally, we describe how changes in the accountability system
influence ELLs in Indiana.
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While the terms English language learner or English learner seem to be
the most widely understood and used term to describe a student who is
learning English as a second or subsequent language, we purposefully
use the term Multilingual Learner to describe these same students.
We believe the term Multilingual Learner (ML) better reflects the rich
linguistic capacity of students who are learning English. As of 2013,
Indiana’s K-12 population includes 54, 054 MLs representing over 263
languages. Approximately 63% of Indiana’s MLs were born in the U.S.,
while the other 37% are immigrants to the U.S. (Indiana Department of
Education, 2014a). Past trends suggest Indiana will continue to educate
increasing numbers of MLs over the next years (U.S. DOE, 2013).
When educators of MLs in Indiana understand and can anticipate how
current education policy will affect MLs, we are better able to advocate
for students, our profession, and as educators.
Indiana’s Test-Based Educational Accountability System
History of the system
Indiana’s current test based accountability system grew, in part, out
of decades of federal-level educational reform initiatives. Educational
reform attempts to improve schools through changes in the way they
are organized and function day-to-day. Modern educational reform is
often traced to the 1983 publication, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative
for Education Reform. This document suggests that America is “at-risk”
of being unable to compete in the world economic marketplace because
the current system of education is inadequate. More recently, No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), enacted in Indiana in 2002, sets the
goal of improving classroom instruction through
•

Stronger accountability for results

•

Research-based education methods

•

More choices for parents (NCLB, 2002)

While NCLB has been criticized for expanding curricula of test
preparation and increasing high-stakes testing, NCLB offered some
mandates that heightened the profile of MLs in K-12 schools. For
example, prior to NCLB schools were able to essentially ignore MLs
because data were not available on specific ML education outcomes.
Under NCLB, however, schools were required to disaggregate
standardized test data for the ML sub-group and to show that the
26
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schools were making progress in providing education (as measured by
standardized test) to MLs. No longer could MLs be ignored in distant
portable classrooms and whisked away to a special teacher. The NCLB
mandated accountability surrounding the education of MLs resulted in
increased funding, professional development, and general educational
attention that had the potential to benefit the K-12 ELL population
(Clewell, Cosentino de Cohen, & Murray, 2007).
A Nation at Risk (1983) and NCLB (2002) have been catalysts
for discussions about and changes in education in the U.S. Under
NCLB 100% of students needed to attain grade level proficiency in
mathematics and reading by 2014; schools failing to attain these goals
faced strenuous federal and state sanctions. The 100% proficiency
goal was set because to set expectations any lower meant our system
was intentionally leaving some children behind. While a goal of grade
level proficiency for all students is noble, the 100% target was a drastic
departure from historical student proficiency trends on standardized tests
(Welner, 2005). Robert Linn (2004), then a researcher at the University
of Colorado, examined trend data from the National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP) to document the extent to which NCLB
100% proficiency requirements were unlikely to be met. Linn found
for eighth grade students, for example, “the rate of improvement in the
percentage of students at the proficient level or above in mathematics
would need to be 6.5 times as rapid between 2003 and 2014 as it was
between 2000 and 2003” (p. 3). Linn and others (e.g., Abedi & Dietel,
2004; Welner, 2004;) predicted the rapid growth in proficiency required
by NCLB was unrealistic and the goal was unattainable.
Because the 100% proficiency goal was unattainable, the U.S.
Department of Education eventually allowed states to apply for an
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) flexibility waiver
from NCLB if they agreed to enact an approved school accountability
plan. As of August 2014, 43 states have received waivers and, at the time
of this writing, an additional two states are in the process of developing
an alternative accountability plan and seeking approval from the U.S.
Department of Education. The Indiana Department of Education (IDOE)
applied for and received one of these waivers in 2012 (U.S. DOE,
2012). As part of the waiver application, the IDOE proposed replacing
the NCLB school evaluation model with a new school evaluation model
that interprets standardized test scores in terms of status and growth
Test-based Accountability Systems
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(U.S. Department of Education, 2014). In August of 2014, the IDOE’s
NCLB waiver was renewed by the U.S. Department of Education (U.S.
DOE, 2014).
Components of the Indiana Accountability System
Student-level Standardized Tests
Indiana’s test-based accountability system includes multiple components.
The cornerstone of the system, however, consists of student scores on
state standardized tests. Currently, Indiana students are required to take a
litany of tests during their K-12 educational career including the Indiana
Statewide Testing for Educational Progress Plus (ISTEP+) primarily in
language arts and mathematics, but also in science and social studies.
Third graders must also take the IREAD-3 and high school students must
sit for End of Course Assessments (ECAs) in English 10, Algebra 1, and
Biology 1. MLs are further required to be assessed yearly to measure
their growth in and attainment of English proficiency using the LAS
Links with scores used for schools Annual Measurable Achievement
Objectives (AMAOs).
Teacher Evaluation System
The 2012-13 school year was the first year in which teachers were
evaluated under the stipulations of legislation passed in 2011. While
the legislation did not mandate a particular evaluation system, the law
did set certain parameters for teacher evaluation. Under Indiana law,
each teacher is rated as ineffective, needing improvement, effective,
highly effective (Cole, Murphy, Rogan, & Eakes, 2013). The rating
calculation must consider student standardized test scores; only teachers
rated in the top two categories are eligible to receive a pay raise (Indiana
Department of Education, 2011). Teachers in the lowest two categories
are subject to sanctions such as immediate or eventual dismissal. The
Indiana Legislature provided no specific guidance on how ESL teachers
or other support personnel should be evaluated.
A-F School Ratings
Public Law 221 (P.L. 221) is Indiana’s K-12 accountability system. P.L.
221 was passed by the state legislature in 1999, and mandates that public
and accredited non-public schools are placed into one of five categories
based on results from ISTEP+ and End-of-Course Assessments (IDOE,
28
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nd). Under P.L. 221, Indiana schools have long received accountability
scores, but a new iteration of the P.L. 221 accountability system, known
as A-F, was approved both by the Indiana State Board of Education and
the U.S. Department of Education in February of 2012. This new A-F
system allowed Indiana to receive a waiver from the adequate yearly
progress requirement of NCLB Act. In effect, the U.S. Department of
Education’s waiver approval gave Indiana flexibility in implementing
NCLB Act requirements in exchange for an accountability system (A-F)
that was focused on increasing student achievement (U.S. DOE, 2012).
While the NCLB Act relied on a status model for evaluating
school improvement, Indiana’s A-F uses a percentile growth model
in addition to the status model. Status models measure the percentage
of students that pass a state standardized test while the growth models
consider how much students grow in performance on standardized
tests either in relationship to content knowledge or their peers (Gong,
Perie, & Dunn, 2006). In Indiana, public schools, accredited non-public
schools, and schools that accept school vouchers are assessed by the
A-F percentile growth model grading system. Elementary and middle
schools are evaluated on growth and performance while high schools are
evaluated on improvement, performance, and graduation rates (Hiller,
DiTommaso, & Plucker, 2012).
Under the plan proposed by the IDOE, Indiana schools will be
evaluated using a combination of the status and growth models, with
the growth model focusing on how students grow in comparison to
their peers. Growth modeling has been used in US schools since 1992
when Tennessee started using value added assessment to evaluate
school districts. Two forms of growth models are typically used for
accountability purposes in U.S. schools: a value added model and a
percentile growth model. Value-added models have been used most
extensively and for the greatest number of years. The exact variables
considered with these models vary across time and state. These models
may consider factors such as family income levels, race, ethnicity,
language status, gender, and student mobility (Franco & Seidel, 2012).
The value added model measures how student test scores change from
year to year or over multiple years. These gains in test scores are then
used to evaluate teacher and/or school performance.
Percentile growth modeling is the latest iteration of growth
modeling used for educational accountability. Betebenner (2009) has
Test-based Accountability Systems
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identified two main assumptions underlying this model: a) past student
performance serves as a strong predictor of future student performance
and b) high quality schools and teachers are better at facilitating growth
in standardized test scores than low quality schools and teachers.
Percentile growth modeling presents a shift in the conceptualization of
student growth. Previous iterations of growth modeling were criterionreferenced. In other words, these models were focused only on how
students grew in their achievement in relationship to a certain set of
criteria: the state academic standards.
Percentile growth modeling adds a normative component to
this growth modeling by comparing how much of an increase a student
has on standardized test scores in comparison to students at similar
levels of achievement (Betebenner, 2009). For example, if a group of
students all have a third grade standardized test scaled score of 350,
their growth on a standardized test will be compared with each other.
If a particular student from this group scores significantly higher than
her peers on the fourth grade test, she will be considered to have high
growth in comparison to her scale score peers. Conversely, if she scores
significantly lower than her peers on the fourth grade test, she will be
considered to have low growth in comparison to her scale score peers.
Adding the normative component to the growth modeling addresses
concerns expressed by researchers questioning the vertical scaling of
content for criterion-referenced standardized assessments in which the
standards for grade levels change from year to year (Amrein-Beardsley,
2008). Instead of comparing scores for tests that are often based on
different standards, this normative growth model compares students.
School scores will show the median growth scores of all the students
in the school in comparison to all the students who completed the test.
Indiana’s student percentile growth model considers the growth
of each student independent of his or her school. The analysis uses
quantile regression analysis which will show a relationship between a
student’s previous test scores and predicted growth in test scores in the
subsequent year of testing. Students are grouped (also called blocking)
by percentiles or quantiles, of standardized test scaled scores into four
different groups:
1. High achieving/high growth
2. High achieving/low growth
3. Low achieving/high growth
4. Low achieving/low growth
30
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Then the student’s growth is compared to students in their same quantile
group, considered their academic peer group, using growth percentiles.
Students are compared to other students in his or her academic peer
group for up to three previous years when these data are available for the
student. Target growth is set for each academic peer group based on the
group’s growth trajectory, and students will be rated as high, average, or
low growth depending on how well they perform. The target percentile
growth will change from year to year depending on the academic peer
group performance on standardized tests. A teacher’s and a school’s
growth scores are calculated based on the average growth of students in
the class or school.
Concerns with the System: Multilingual Learners,
Their Teachers, & Their Schools
Does Test-based Accountability Improve Educational Outcomes?
The primary concern for using test-based accountability system is that
there is no evidence that using student test scores as part of teacher
and school evaluation systems results in higher student achievement.
In fact, according to the National Research Council, high-stakes testing
and accountability when measured by national measures for more than
a decade have produced little to no impact on student achievement,
despite great cost and emphasis (Hout & Elliot, 2011). Furthermore,
in international comparisons, US 15 year olds maintained their relative
standing to other countries in reading and significantly decreased in
math from 2000-2009, the years of high stakes testing accountability
under NCLB (OECD, 2010).
Validity Issues Related to Indiana’s Accountability System
The primary cause of the problems with using standardized test scores
to evaluate teachers and schools is the validity of the tests, especially
when they are used with ML students. A valid measure assesses what
the evaluators believe that it is testing. Without validity, standardized
test scores, teacher evaluations, and school A-F grades are meaningless
because they are not measuring what the evaluators think they are
measuring. In the next section, we present a few reasons that explain
why the use of standardized tests for student, teacher, and school level
evaluations and high-stakes decisions is invalid for students in general
but also for ML students specifically.
Test-based Accountability Systems
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Non-random assignment. One of the principles of high quality
empirical research is that when comparing different groups, the groups
should either be randomly assigned or should have highly similar
characteristics. Comparing schools is difficult at best. Students are
not randomly assigned to schools, and schools vary greatly in terms of
available resources and student demographics and characteristics. This
non-random assignment of students to schools and the vast differences
in student populations between schools present a significant bias when
making cross-school comparisons (Schochet & Chiang, 2010). MLs in
Indiana, for example, tend to be clustered in particular schools and school
corporations. According to the IDOE, only 27 out of almost 300 Indiana
school corporations reported a Limited English Proficient population of
at least 10% of the total student body (IDOE, 2014b). Furthermore, even
within the ML student subpopulation, the demographic composition of
the ML students at different schools can vary widely. For example,
one school may have a large number of ML students whose parents
are managers and executives for an automotive manufacturer and
receive extensive tutoring outside of school, while other schools may
have large numbers of ML students who are refugees with significant
interrupted formal schooling. While these concentrations of MLs might
allow schools to pool instructional resources and language programs,
the concentrations are further evidence that comparing schools based
on test scores as if all schools are equal is erroneous. In other words,
Indiana schools serving MLs are not homogenous and student data from
those schools should be interpreted in light of the specific complexities
of each school population.
Standardized tests do not measure teacher quality. Multiple
factors influence student performance on standardized tests. Betebenner
(2009) is one of the developers of Indiana’s test-based accountability
system. The assumptions that Betebenner (2009) used in developing
Indiana’s A-F accountability system have serious validity issues and
flaws in logic. His first assumption was that high quality schools and
teachers are better at facilitating growth in standardized test scores than
low quality schools and teachers. By stating this assumption, Betebenner
implied that standardized test scores are a valid measure of teacher and
school quality. However, this assertion is contrary to almost 50 years
of extensive research on the impact of teachers and schools on student
achievement. These studies indicate that typically 7-10% of variability
32
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in student performance on standardized tests is attributable to teacher
and school level factors (Coleman, 1966, Heubert & Hauser, 1999;
Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 1998; Schochet & Chiang, 2010). According
to the American Statistical Association, more recent studies focused on
basing teacher and school evaluation on student growth shows that only
1-14% of student test score growth can be attributed to teachers (ASA,
2014). Non-school variables such as (1) low birth-weight and nongenetic prenatal influences on children; (2) inadequate medical, dental,
and vision care, often a result of inadequate or no medical insurance;
(3) food insecurity; (4) environmental pollutants; (5) family relations
and family stress; and (6) neighborhood characteristics (Berliner, 2009,
p. 1), exert a much greater influence on student achievement than do
school-related factors.
The most prominent non-school factors that influence ML
student achievement include language differences, parent education
level, previous experience with schooling, length of time in U.S.
schools, cultural and acculturation issues, and native language literacy
development (Abedi, 2002; DeCapua & Marshall, 2010; Garcia & Frede,
2010). Even the developers of the Indiana test-based accountability
system acknowledge that teachers who have large numbers of ML
students will likely have low growth scores on standardized tests (DiazBilello & Briggs, 2014). Due to weaknesses in connecting student
standardized test scores to teacher and school evaluations, the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences considers valueadded measures of teacher effectiveness “too unstable to be considered
fair or reliable” (Heubert & Hauser, 1999) and the American Statistical
Association (2014) calls the statistical underpinning of the system
“unstable,” even under ideal conditions, due to its large error rates.
Characteristics of the multilingual learner. For MLs, the
validity of using standardized test scores as a measurement of school
effectiveness, or even student learning, is questionable. The test-based
accountability system assumes the results of state standardized content
tests can be interpreted as valid measures of MLs content knowledge.
For example, it is assumed that a standardized test of grade level
mathematics content will show the extent to which a student knows
and can demonstrate the mathematics content. Yet, this assumption
ignores other factors, unrelated to mathematics content, which the test
is actually measuring. MLs are, by definition, in the process of learning
Test-based Accountability Systems
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English, including academic English. When an ML takes a standardized
mathematics test, that test is measuring not only the student’s mastery of
the mathematics, but is also measuring -and perhaps is mostly measuringthe student’s ability to understand the academic English of the test.
Certain types of English language that often appear on standardized
tests and contribute to construct-irrelevant variance include unfamiliar
vocabulary, culturally bound idiomatic language, confusing syntax like
double negatives, morphologically complex words, and long sentences
with multiple clauses and passive voice (Abedi, 2002; Young, 2008).
Norming group. The norming groups used to make comparisons
amongst quantiles present another psychometric issue.
Norm
referenced interpretation of test results means that one student’s scores
will be compared against the scores of the “norming group,” a group of
students’ who have already taken the same test. Inappropriate norming
groups are known to substantially affect the validity of outcomes
on standardized tests (American Educational Research Association
[AERA], 1999). This means that a standardized test developed for
one group of students is not necessarily valid for a different group
of students. Standardized test results for a student who is a ML, for
example, should be interpreted with caution if the norming group on
which the percentile ranks were constructed did not include English
learners. In A-F, the state will not disaggregate sub-groups and will
indeed use cross sub-group comparisons to establish a letter grade for
schools. Thus, the growth of a ML will be compared to a norming group
not necessarily composed of MLs and, thus, the factors that uniquely
affect MLs (i.e., language development, cultural differences, prior
educational differences, etc.) will not be considered. The AERA’s and
National Council on Measurement in Education’s joint Standards for
Educational and Psychological Testing (1999), for example, note that
“norms based on native speakers of English either should not be used
with individuals whose first language is not English or such individuals’
test results should be interpreted as reflecting in part current level of
English proficiency rather than ability, potential, aptitude or personality
characteristics or symptomatology” (p. 91).
Invalid measures of learning.
Indiana’s test-based
accountability system, including the growth model components of the
system, is grounded in student performance on standardized tests, yet
standardized tests offer a limited, and often invalid, measure of student
34
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learning. Indiana’s academic standards are, in the words of the IDOE
“world-class standards” that support students in becoming college and
career ready (IDOE, nd). Unfortunately, the high stakes standardized
tests purported to measure student mastery of those standards fail to
fully assess the rich student learning that occurs in Indiana classrooms.
The American Statistical Association (2014) highlighted this issue in a
recent report:
Ideally, tests should fully measure student achievement
with respect to the curriculum objectives and content
standards adopted by the state, in both breadth and depth.
In practice, no test meets this stringent standard, and it
needs to be recognized that, at best, most VAMs [value
added measures] predict only performance on the test
and not necessarily long-range learning outcomes. Other
student outcomes are predicted only to the extent that
they are correlated with test scores. A teacher’s efforts
to encourage students’ creativity or help colleagues
improve their instruction, for example, are not explicitly
recognized in VAMs (np).
In other words, standardized tests only measure a small segment of the
content and processes students learn in relation to a particular standard
and these tests do little to help us understand a student’s long-term
mastery of the standard.
Ceiling and bottom effects. In addition to norming issues, the
growth of the highest and lowest performing students in the proposed
A-F system is particularly concerning, due to phenomena called the
ceiling effect and the bottom effect. The ceiling effect refers to the
tendency for a high performing student’s test score growth to be smaller
than average because the student’s initial score already approaches the
highest score possible. In the A-F system, this would be a student whose
initial test score falls near the top of the highest quantile. These high
performing students have little room to grow based on the standardized
test score, and thus, these students and the schools in which they are
enrolled could be misconstrued as low performing. A bottoming out
effect, in contrast, affects students whose test scores fall near the lowest
scores possible, or in the A-F system, near the bottom of the lowest
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quantile. These low performing students could show substantial growth
based on standardized test scores, yet because they began so low within
the quantile, their test performance could still be considered to be
insufficient compared to other students whose initial scores were in the
upper scores of the quantile. This issue disproportionately affects MLs,
especially those MLs just beginning to learn English due to the fact
that standardized tests in academic English are often not linguistically
accessible for MLs. Thus, the scores of beginning MLs tend to fall
within the bottom of the lowest quantile and the language background
of MLs adds another source of error in test-based accountability systems
(Abedi, 2002). Schools with high numbers of high performing students,
low performing students, or high numbers of MLs are likely to receive
artificially low grades.
Consequences
An additional group of concerns involves the consequences of the A-F
accountability system for schools. Many prominent educational experts
have spoken out against the misuse of standardized test scores and their
impact on children. These concerns include impacts on student learning
and equity issues.
Narrowing of the curriculum
The heavy emphasis on standardized testing over the past decade has
led to a narrowing of the curriculum to a focus on low-level basic skills
(Hout & Elliot, 2011). In order to keep their jobs when test scores
determine teacher evaluations, teachers often choose or are required to
focus on test preparation. Furthermore, most schools that are facing
sanctions because of high stakes testing have adopted pre-packaged,
teacher-proof test preparation programs. This focus on test preparation
often greatly limits or eliminates curricula rich in critical and creative
thinking skills (Jones, 1999; Jones et al., 2004). MLs in particular
need rich and relevant curricula that will support academic language
development. MLs are under pressure to simultaneously learn content
(mathematics, history, etc.) while also learning academic language. A
rich and relevant curriculum allows MLs to make connections between
the content and their own life experiences and provides MLs multiple
entry points for learning academic language.
36
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Disproportional Impact on High Poverty Schools
Disproportional impact on high poverty schools is an additional concern
under the current growth model. According to Franco and Seidel (2012),
value added models appear stable for schools that reflect the average
demographics for a state. However, for schools that vary significantly
in their student characteristics, significant reliability issues arise in using
value-added measures for accountability purposes. Scott Elliott (2012),
a reporter at the Indianapolis Star, examined the impact of the growth
model accountability system on Indiana schools. He found that
For the state’s largest high-poverty districts, huge percentages
of their schools would see their grades go down — 44 percent in
IPS, 53 percent in Gary, 57 percent in Fort Wayne and 65 percent
in Hammond. But large, wealthy districts had hardly any schools
with grades that fell — zero in Carmel, zero in Zionsville, 12
percent in Center Grove and 20 percent in Hamilton Southeastern.
Franco and Seidel’s warnings about the disproportionate impact of
growth models on high poverty and schools with diverse student
populations are manifested in Indiana schools. This disparity is further
highlighted in Elliot’s description of what is happening to School 46 in
Indianapolis Public Schools:
Under the new system, School 46 would receive less credit for
the good work it does to help students overcome their significant
challenges — 91 percent of its students come from families
poor enough to qualify for free or reduced-price lunches (annual
income of less than $42,000 for a family of four). The school
would earn a bonus for raising scores, but only enough to raise
its grade to a C.
Despite the fact that School 46 is showing significant growth in student
performance on state standardized tests, they would still be labeled as
a C school.
The disproportionate impact of the A-F system on high poverty
schools also affects MLs. Fry (2008) found that at the national level, the
schools in which MLs are enrolled on average have greater proportions
of students living in poverty than schools with no MLs. Furthermore,
Test-based Accountability Systems
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large, urban school districts in Indiana tend to be accountable for more
subgroups and ML students are often identified in multiple subgroups
(Burke, DePalma, Ginther, Morita-Mullaney, & Young, 2014). For
example, in addition to being part of the limited English proficient
(LEP) subgroup, a ML student might also be a part of the Hispanic
and free/reduced lunch subgroups. Inclusion in multiple subgroups
magnifies the impact that ML students have on teacher, school, and
district evaluations.
The growth model system dis-incentivizes high performing
teachers from working in low performing schools and working with
MLs. As stated in previous sections, since only about 7-10% variability
in student performance of on achievement tests can be attributed
to teacher and school level factors, the context of where a teacher
teaches makes a huge impact on his or her students’ standardized test
scores. If teachers move from high to low performing schools, they
risk lower teacher evaluations, increased criticism, more hostile work
environments, lower moral, and possible job loss, not because they are
ineffective teachers but that their students have other issues that impact
their performance on standardized tests. Under new teacher evaluation
systems, teachers’ annual performance and salary increases depend, in
part, on student standardized test scores.
Shifting Resources Away
Indiana’s A-F accountability system is based on flawed science. When
NCLB was initiated, it mandated that all educational decisions be based
on the US Department of Education’s definition of scientifically-based
research. When the research did not end up supporting the political
agenda of NCLB, policymakers ignored the research. Indiana’s
accountability system is statistically complicated and complex enough
that a layperson, a teacher, or a school administrator would likely be
hard-pressed to understand how the system works in practice.
Using quantitative data and statistical models does not good science
make. Hoping and believing that the Indiana status/growth models and
punitive repercussions for student, teacher, and school evaluation are an
effective way to ensure teacher effectiveness does not make the system
valid and contradicts what statistical and behavioral science research
show as good evaluation and accountability practice.
The time,
effort, and money spent on the A-F system, which has proven to be an
38
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ineffective lever for school accountability, is a great loss of opportunity
for Indiana’s children, diverting attention away from research and
development of policies that have much greater potential to improve
education for all children.
Conclusion
Indiana’s children deserve research-based approaches to educational
evaluation, not a system based on erroneous assumptions and politics;
Indiana tax payers deserve to have their tax dollars spent on effective
policies that will have a positive impact on children, schools, and
communities. For more than a decade, the reward and punishment
policies of standardized-test based accountability have been failed
policies for MLs. Continuing to implement the same system of rewards
and punishment will not improve educational outcomes, especially for
MLs. For teacher and school evaluation systems to be useful tools in
informing school improvement efforts, the data gathered and analyzed
must be meaningful. The current use of the status and growth models is not
measuring teacher and school effectiveness in a statistically significant
way because other non-school related factors are influencing test score
outcomes to a much greater extent than are school level factors. These
factors include, but are not limited to, language difference, cultural
difference, and poverty-related factors for teacher and school quality.
Punishing or firing educators and closing schools due to the test scores
of their students is not going to address these underlying issues. Instead,
policymakers need to find ways to provide more support for families
and neighborhoods that are facing these challenges. Furthermore, we
need to make high stakes decisions about educating our students based
on multiple forms of assessments, including a much heavier emphasis
on authentic and performance assessments.
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